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Abstract 
 
How do competitors react to each other’s price-promotion and advertising actions? How do these 
reactions influence the net sales impact we observe? We answer these questions by performing a 
large-scale empirical study of the short-run and long-run reactions to promotion and advertising 
shocks in over 400 consumer product categories, over a four-year time span.  
Competitive reaction can be passive, accommodating or retaliatory. We first develop a 
series of expectations on the type and intensity of reaction behavior, and on the moderators of 
this behavior. These expectations are assessed in two ways. First, vector-autoregressive models 
quantify the short-run and long-run effect of a promotion or advertising action on competitive 
sales and on competitive reactions. By cataloging the numerical results, we are able to formulate 
empirical generalizations of reaction behavior (“how do they react?”). Second, we estimate 
structural models of reaction intensity, in function of various market and competitive 
characteristics (“what are the drivers of reaction?”). Finally, by comparing our findings on 
reaction behavior with those on promotion and advertising effectiveness, we are able to evaluate 
competitive reaction behavior (“are they reacting as they should?”).  
A major finding is that competitive reaction is predominantly passive. When it is present, 
it is usually retaliatory in the same instrument, but accommodating or retaliatory in a different 
instrument. There are very few long-run consequences of any type of reaction behavior. We also 
report on several moderating effects that are in line with expectations, and that support the 
presence of a certain amount of rationality in competitive reaction behavior.  
The net impact of the over-time effects of advertising and price-promotion attacks, 
competitive reactions and the sales effectiveness of each, is that competitors’ sales are generally 
not affected, and especially not in the long run. We weigh the evidence that this sales neutrality is 
“natural” (i.e., due to the nature of consumer response) versus “managed” (i.e., due to the 
vigilance and effectiveness of competitors), and conclude in favor of the former.  
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1. Introduction 
In consumer and business markets alike, we observe a never-ending sequence of marketing 
actions and competitive reactions that eventually shape both the structure of a market and the 
performance of its participants. New products are launched, distribution is developed, advertising 
campaigns are initiated, prices adjusted, etc.  The market-response literature has made substantial 
progress in quantifying the typical short-run performance effects of such marketing actions and 
reactions, and we have begun to understand some of their long-run consequences as well (e.g., 
Hanssens, Parsons and  Schultz 2001; Leeflang et al. 2000).  
In this repetitive marketing game, managers need to know whether or not marketing 
reactions are necessary (i.e., essential to the long-run survival of their brands) or discretionary, 
i.e., they may have desirable short-run outcomes, but are inconsequential to the brand's long-run 
competitive position. This is a difficult task, as it entails knowledge about the direction of a 
competitive effect (beneficial, harmful or neutral), its duration, as well as the effectiveness of 
competitive response for both retaliating and accommodating behavior. Absent such knowledge, 
it is not surprising that empirical studies find systematic deviations between actual vs. Nash-
optimal marketing spending levels in competitive markets. For example, some competitors may 
behave sub-optimally while others are supra-optimal, i.e., they fare better than they should (e.g., 
Carpenter et al. 1988).  
Our paper begins this process by examining the way in which competitors react to two of 
the most prevailing forms of marketing activity, price promotions and advertising. We examine 
cross-sales and competitive reaction elasticities due to price promotion or advertising attacks, 
both in the short and the long run, and quantify the moderating impact of a variety of brand and 
category factors influencing the magnitude of these elasticities.  
Our study is based on all major participants in over 400 consumer product categories in 
The Netherlands, sampled weekly over a four-year period. We focus on the top 3 brands in each 
category and measure promotion and advertising reaction behavior, while controlling for the rest 
of the marketing mix, i.e. distribution coverage, new-product introductions, feature and display 
support. To that effect, we use long-term time-series modeling that measures the short- and long-
run differential impact of promotion and advertising attacks, in terms of sales response as well as 
competitive response. The breadth (number of product categories and brands) and detail (full 
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marketing mix) of our data set leads to a first major contribution of the study: a rich set of 
empirical generalizations on the intensity, duration and effectiveness of different competitive 
reactions. As a second contribution, we link this extensive set of response and reaction 
elasticities to a number of theory-based brand and category characteristics, to test under what 
circumstances competitive reactions are most likely to be incurred and to be effective. Finally, 
the combined evidence from our empirical generalizations and our subsequent hypotheses tests 
allows us to infer whether cross-sales effects are primarily due to the nature of consumer 
response or due to competitors’ vigilance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the 
conceptual framework guiding our research. Using this framework, we develop predictions 
concerning main effects of price promotions and advertising on cross-sales and reactions of 
competing brands, as well as the role of factors that can increase or reduce these effects. Next, we 
describe the data set and the methodology, and we report the results. The final section discusses 
the findings, draws conclusions and provides suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework on Competitive Reactions and Cross-Sales Effects 
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual framework that guided our research. We examine the effect of a 
shock in price promotions and advertising by brand A (the Attacker) on the sales of rival brand D 
(the Defender) as well as on the intensity of D’s competitive reaction to the shock by A. In this 
study, price promotions are temporary price reductions offered to the consumer while advertising 
refers to mass-media advertising. Competitive reactions using the same two instruments, price 
promotions or advertising, are studied next. The effects of a price promotion or advertising  
shock by brand A on brand D’s competitive reaction and sales are allowed to be moderated by 
brand and category characteristics. 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
2.1. Effect of price promotion and advertising on cross-sales and reactions of competing 
brands 
Cross-sales effects. Expectations about the effects of a price promotion or advertising shock by 
brand A on the sales of brand D can to a large extent be derived from the own-sales effects of 
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these marketing efforts. If the own-sales effect is small, the cross-sales effect is expected to be 
even smaller. A similar observation applies to the impact of regular price changes, for example 
the meta-analytic own elasticities reported in Tellis (1988) tend to be considerably higher than 
the cross-elasticities reported in Sethuraman, Srinivasan and Kim (1999, Table 3).  
Price promotions are known to result in a substantial, albeit typically temporary, own-
sales increase at the brand level (Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox 1995). On the other hand, the short-
run effect of advertising on own sales is often small, especially for well-established, mature 
brands as examined in this study (Lodish et al. 1995). It has been argued that advertising has a 
larger long-run sales effect. However, Deighton, Henderson and Neslin (1994) found that 
advertising did not have a significant effect on repeat purchase, a main requirement for long-run 
effectiveness. This suggests that the long-run own sales effects of advertising can be expected to 
also be modest.  
Based on the discussion of own-sales effects, we expect that in general, the short-run 
cross-sales effects of price and advertising are larger than the corresponding long-run cross-sales 
effects, and that the cross-sales effect of price promotions (especially in the short run) is larger 
than the cross-sales effect of advertising.  
 
Competitive reactions. When a competing brand initiates a price or advertising shock, how do 
other brands respond? Key issues in this respect include whether the defender uses the same 
instrument as the attacker (simple reaction) or a different instrument (multiple reaction) and how 
intense the competitive reaction by the defending brand will be. The intensity of the response can 
range from very accommodating (e.g., substantially decreasing advertising in response to an 
advertising shock), to passive (no reaction), to strong retaliation (e.g., substantially increasing 
advertising in response to an advertising shock).  
We expect that absence of a reaction to a competitive attack is most common, while 
accommodating reactions are least common (Leeflang and Wittink 1996, Robinson 1988). 
Further, we propose that competitive actions with price promotions generate more frequent as 
well as stronger competitive retaliations than competitive actions using advertising. Managers 
have a limited span of attention and time, so they will attend only to certain competitive actions. 
More visible actions, which generate higher levels of awareness, have a greater likelihood of 
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attracting competitors’ response, and price actions are especially visible (Chen and Miller 1994, 
Leeflang and Wittink 2001). Further, price actions can directly affect the business’ bottom line, 
their impact is relatively easily determined, and they tend to be more provocative (Chen and 
MacMillan 1992). 
Third, we propose that competitive reactions with price promotions are more prevalent 
than reactions with advertising. It is plausible that if managers notice a competitive attack and 
intend to respond, they will be inclined to use an instrument that typically yields fast results. 
From their previous experience, they will have noticed that price promotions usually yield faster 
results than advertising (cf. Blattberg, Briesch and Fox 1995, Lodish et al. 1995). When we 
combine this proposition with the previous one, it suggests that price-promotion reactions to 
price-promotion attacks should be more prevalent than any other action-reaction combination.  
 
2.2. Factors affecting the cross-sales effect of price promotions and advertising 
Key factors affecting the impact of a price promotion or advertising shock by the attacking brand 
A on the sales of the defending brand D encompass characteristics of the attacking and the 
defending brand –including the brands’ equity, whether they are a private label or a national 
brand, and their relative position on price and advertising - and the intensity of the competitive 
reaction of brand D on the competitive attack by brand A.  
 
Brand equity. Carpenter et al. (1988) noted that not all brands are affected equally by 
competitive marketing actions. We argue that if a brand has high equity, it will be less vulnerable 
to competitive actions. We further propose that its own competitive moves will have a greater 
negative effect on the sales of other brands. A high-equity brand is characterized by high 
consumer awareness and strong, positive associations (Aaker 1991). High brand awareness 
increases the likelihood that the brand is included in the consideration set of the consumer 
(Nedungadi 1990) and positive brand associations provide reasons to buy the brand and 
constitute the basis for brand loyalty (Jacoby and Chestnut 1978). Thus, the higher a brand’s 
equity, the smaller its vulnerability to price promotions or advertising attacks while its own 
attacks should have a greater effect on sales of other brands.  
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Private label vs. national brand. Previous research has revealed an asymmetric pattern of 
switching between private labels and national brands. Marketing activities (price promotions) by 
national brands affect sales of private labels more than vice versa (Allenby and Rossi 1991, 
Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989). This is explained by the fact that national brands are typically 
of higher quality than private labels. If a high-quality national brand is temporarily decreased in 
price, it allows consumers who currently buy the lower-quality private label to trade up on 
quality. A price promotion of a lower-quality private label also increases the brand’s 
attractiveness but does not generate any additional favorable quality effect. As pointed out by 
Sivakumar and Raj (1997), moving from high to low quality does not have the favorable 
psychological connotation associated with moving from low to high quality, as consumers prefer 
high quality to low quality.  
Given the recent increase in quality of private labels (Zimmerman 1998), one may wonder 
whether this effect still holds true. However, we argue that the argument above not only applies 
to quality but also to image/emotional benefits. National brands typically provide more emotional 
benefits than private labels (Kapferer 1997), and as such moving from a private label to a 
national brand is still more desirable from a psychological perspective than vice versa. Thus, we 
expect that if the competitive attack is carried out by a private label, it will have a less negative 
effect on the sales of competing brands than when the attack is carried out by a national brand. 
Conversely, if the defender is a private label, its sales will be more affected than when it is a 
national brand. 
 
Asymmetric and neighborhood price promotion effects. Several authors have pointed out that 
the relative prices of competing brands affect the cross-sales effects of price promotions. 
Sethuraman, Srinivasan, and Kim (1999) distinguished between two types of cross-price effects 
due to the relative prices of competing brands: the asymmetric and the neighborhood effect. 
The asymmetric price effect says that a price promotion by a higher-priced brand affects 
sales of a lower-priced brand more than vice versa. This is explained by the notion that higher 
priced brands are typically also of higher quality (Shapiro 1983, Tellis and Wernerfelt 1987). 
While consumers who currently buy the low-priced, low-quality brand  will be interested in 
trading up on quality if the price of the higher-priced, higher-quality brand  is temporarily 
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decreased, fewer people will be willing to trade down on quality, even if the brand is cheaper 
than before, because the quality is simply less than deemed acceptable (Blattberg and Wisniewski 
1989)1.  
The neighborhood price promotion effect states that brands that are farther apart in price 
have weaker cross-price promotion effects than brands that are closer to each other (Sethuraman, 
Srinivasan, and Kim 1999). This neighborhood effect can be explained using the argument 
developed by Bronnenberg and Wathieu (1996). They showed analytically that the impact of a 
price discount of a brand on the sales of another brand is negatively related to the difference in 
quality between the two brands. That is, the smaller the quality difference, the stronger the cross-
sales effect. Due to the expected positive association between quality and price, we expect that 
the closer in price the attacking and the defending brand are, the more the sales of the defending 
brand will be affected by the price promotion of the attacking brand.  
 
Asymmetric and neighborhood advertising effects. The argument based on positive associations 
between price and quality can be extended to advertising. As early as 1953, Chamberlin (1953, p. 
7) argued that “it doesn’t pay to advertise a poor product.” Klein and Leffler (1981) and 
Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) derived analytically that advertising should be positively related to 
quality. Marquardt and McGann (1975) and Archibald, Haulman, and Moody (1983) provided 
empirical evidence of the positive association between advertising and quality. Hence, it is 
plausible that the asymmetric and neighborhood effects will also be observed for advertising. We 
hypothesize that an advertising shock by a heavily advertised brand has a larger adverse effect on 
sales of a less-advertised brand than the reverse (asymmetric effect). Further, we expect that 
brands that are farther apart in advertising expenditure exhibit weaker cross-advertising sales 
effects than brands that are closer to each other (neighborhood effect). 
 
Competitive reaction of defender. The net effect of a marketing action such as a price promotion 
or advertising shock on the sales of a competing brand depends in part on the way the competing 
brand responds (Putsis and Dhar 1998). Stronger retaliation to the attack should have a positive 
effect on the sales of the defender, i.e., we expect that any decline in sales will be smaller and any 
increase will be larger.  
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Table 1A summarizes our predictions concerning factors affecting the effect of price 
promotion/advertising shocks by the attacking brand on the sales of a defending brand.  
 
2.3. Factors affecting the intensity of competitive reactions to price promotions and 
advertising 
As mentioned earlier, we study the intensity of competitive reactions to price promotions and 
advertising attacks with the same instruments. The organizational decision making literature 
suggests that three fundamental underlying behavioral drivers of  competitive reaction are 
awareness of the competitive attack, motivation to react, and ability to react (Chen 1996, Chen, 
Smith, and Grimm 1992, Dutton and Jackson 1987). These three drivers are reflected in the 
specific factors affecting the intensity of competitive reactions to price promotions and 
advertising discussed below, and provide a conceptual rationale for the specific predictions 
made.  
More specifically, we submit that intensity of competitive reaction is influenced by the 
characteristics of the attacking and the defending brand - including the market power of the 
attacking brand, the power asymmetry between attacker and defender, and whether 
attacker/defender are a private label or a national brand -, category characteristics such as market 
concentration and category growth, and the change in sales of the defender caused by the 
competitive attack – i.e., the impact of the competitive attack.  
 
Market power of the attacking brand. For at least two reasons, we expect that the intensity of 
retaliation of the defending brand to a competitive move by the attacking brand increases with 
the market power of the attacking brand. First, more powerful brands are more visible, meaning 
that their competitive actions are more often noticed. Awareness of competitive moves is a 
necessary condition for a reaction to occur (Chen, Smith, and Grimm 1992). Second, competitive 
attacks by powerful brands are perceived to be more threatening to the defender (Gatignon and 
Reibstein 1997). Social conflict theory posits that the greater the perceived threat posed by an 
actor, the greater the motivation of other actors to react in kind (Deutsch 1969, Deutsch and 
Krauss 1962). Similarly, in strategy research, Dutton and Jackson (1987) proposed that 
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competitors are motivated to take stronger retaliatory action if they view the action as 
threatening.  
 
Power asymmetry. Consistent with work in sociology (e.g., Emerson 1962, Bacharach and 
Lawler 1981) we argue that the intensity of retaliation by the affected entities (i.e., brands) 
depends on power structure. Whereas the large threat posed by a powerful attacking brand 
constitutes a strong motivation to react (see above), the power of the defending brand relative to 
the attacking brand is a crucial component of the defender’s ability to react. Thus, not only does 
the market power of the attacking brand matter, but the difference in market power between the 
attacking and defending brand – called power asymmetry or power imbalance (Molm 1990) – is 
important as well.  
Relative power theory argues that the greater the asymmetry in power favoring the 
attacker, the smaller the likelihood that the defender will retaliate (Emerson 1972). Indeed, the 
defender wants to avoid the risk of incurring overwhelming retaliation in turn. On the other hand, 
the more powerful the defender vis-à-vis the attacker, the greater the likelihood that the defender 
will retaliate if attacked (Cook and Emerson 1978, Rubin and Brown 1975). Relatively powerful 
defenders have less reason for restraint and fear retaliation less. Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 
(1998) found support for relative power theory in an interorganizational context. In this study, we 
apply relative power theory to competition between brands.  
 
Private label vs. national brand. We argue that, in general, there is less competitive reaction 
associated with private labels, both when the private label is the attacker and when it is the 
defender. The primary reason is that the motivation to react will be less in case of private labels. 
When a private label makes a competitive move, it may be seen as less threatening by other 
private labels compared to when a national brand makes a competitive move. Indeed, within-
store purchase influences are typically stronger (Kahn and McAlister 1997) and hence, private 
labels may compete less directly with each other than with national brands. National brands are 
less likely to retaliate to private labels than to other national brands since they have much to gain 
from a collaborative relation with retailers. Their relationship is better described by co-opetition 
than by competition (Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997). Moreover, in case of a reaction with price 
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promotions, both the national brand’s motivation and its ability to react to an attack by a private 
label are restricted. Indeed, price promotions require retailer cooperation which is less likely to 
be forthcoming when it concerns a response to a competitive move by the retailer’s own brand. 
When considering the role of the defender, it is also plausible that private labels react less 
to competitive attacks than national brands. If the attacker is a national brand, then that brand as 
well as the retailer selling it might benefit from the additional sales generated from the increased 
marketing effort. Moreover, given the considerable control the retailer has over the marketing 
(especially pricing/price promotion) activities of the national brands, it may feel less threatened. 
When the attacking brand is a private label, the defending private label may feel less threatened 
as argued above.  
 
Market concentration. In concentrated markets, it is easier to monitor the competition. This 
makes it more likely that moves of rival brands are noticed, which is a necessary requirement for 
initiating a competitive response (Chen, Smith, and Grimm 1992). Thus, we expect that 
competitive reactions are generally more likely in markets with fewer brands. On the other hand, 
economic theory suggests that in concentrated markets, profit margins are higher. Companies 
may be less motivated to engage in a price war in concentrated markets because it dissipates 
attractive high margins (Ramaswamy, Gatignon, and Reibstein 1994). They are relatively more 
likely to retaliate with other marketing instruments. Ramaswamy, Gatignon, and Reibstein (1994) 
found that in industrial markets, market concentration had a negative impact on the likelihood of 
price retaliation and a positive impact on the likelihood of retaliation with marketing 
communication (i.c., sales force). Putsis and Dhar (1998) found that, in consumer product 
categories, non-cooperative response to price promotions is more likely with a larger number of 
brands. 
Building on this work, we expect that market concentration has a positive effect on the 
intensity of retaliation with advertising and a negative effect on the intensity of retaliation with 
price promotions.  
 
Category growth. If category sales are flat, competitive actions quickly become a zero-sum game 
in which the attacking brand’s sales gains are the defending brand’s sales losses. In such low-
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growth markets, the defender will be highly motivated to respond aggressively to protect sales 
volume (Aaker and Day 1986). On the other hand, market growth is a critical structural indicator 
of future potential profits, hence brands in high-growth categories should be more motivated to 
retaliate in order to defend their position (Gatignon, Weitz, and Bansal 1990).  
The empirical evidence is mixed as well. In consumer markets, Robinson (1988) found 
that competitive retaliation to new-product introductions was stronger in growing markets, while 
a study of industrial firms by Ramaswamy, Gatignon, and Reibstein (1994) found that retaliation 
with salesforce (price) was more (less) common in high-growth markets. Given these two 
contradictory theoretical views on the impact of category growth on reaction intensity and 
inconclusive empirical evidence, we examine the effect of category growth in an exploratory 
fashion. 
 
Cross-sales effect. We expect that the higher the short-term decline in sales of the defending 
brand due to a competitive move by the attacking brand, the more intense the retaliation by the 
defender. In Chen and MacMillan’s (1992) work, the loss of sales due to a competitive move is 
actually a precondition for any reaction to occur. The significant negative effect on sales reveals 
that something important is at stake. The defending brand will perceive the attack as detrimental 
to its own position and hence has a greater motivation to retaliate (Chen and Miller 1994). 
Furthermore, the resulting decline in its own short-term sales is readily visible to the defending 
brand, which makes the reaction more likely. Consistent with this hypothesis, Leeflang and 
Wittink (2001) found that the greater the cross-brand elasticity, the greater the corresponding 
reaction elasticity. Since long-term effects are more difficult to observe first-hand, we do not 
expect this cross-sales effect to hold in the long run.  
 
Table 1B gives an overview of our predictions concerning factors affecting the intensity 
of retaliation by the defending brand to a competitive price promotion/advertising shock. 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
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3. Data & Methodology  
3.1. Data description 
Data are available on 442 frequently-purchased consumer-good categories in the 
Netherlands.2 These categories correspond to IRI’s classification in different product types, and 
give a quasi-complete coverage of the goods offered in a typical supermarket. The data set, which 
was obtained from IRI/Europanel (for volume sales, price, distribution coverage, new-product-
introduction, and feature-and/or-display information) and the BBC research agency (advertising), 
covers 4 years of weekly scanner data, and is described in more detail in Nijs et al. (2001). For 
each of these categories, the top 3 brands are considered, provided they obtain an average share 
of at least 5% over the sampling period. The breadth (number of categories) as well as detail (full 
marketing mix) of the data at hand allows us to not only derive extensive empirical 
generalizations on the nature of competitive reactivity, but should also allow us to test the 
framework outlined in Section 2. 
 
3.2 Derivation of cross-sales and reaction elasticities 
Long-run time-series techniques are used to derive our focal constructs, i.e., the cross-sales 
elasticities for both advertising and price-promotions, along with the corresponding (simple and 
multiple) reaction elasticities. Each of these elasticities is estimated for both the short and the 
long run, for the different brand-combinations in each of the categories in our data set. In a 
second step, these elasticity estimates become the dependent variables in a structural model that 
links them to the set of covariates described in our conceptual framework. 
A six-equation VARX model with the logarithm of sales, price and advertising 
expenditures of two brands (i and j) as endogenous variables, and their distribution coverage, 
feature and display, feature activity only and display activity only as exogenous variables, is used 
to link performance and control variables.3  VARX models are specified in levels, differences, or 
error-correction format, depending on preliminary unit-root and cointegration tests (Powers et al. 
1991).  The different options taken in the implementation of these tests are summarized in Table 
2. 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
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The most general VARX model thus obtained is given in Equation (1). In this equation, it 
is assumed that all variables have a unit root, and that an equilibrium or cointegrating 
relationship exists between the different variables. If no such relationship is found, all α-
parameters (which measure the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium) are restricted to 
zero. If some of the variables are found to be stationary, they are specified in the levels rather 
than in the first differences. For mixed models in levels and differences, we test for cointegration 
among the latter, and restrict the α-parameters of the former to zero. If an endogenous variable is 
found not to have a deterministic trend in the data-generating process (based on the procedure 
described in Enders 1995), the corresponding δ-parameter is set to zero, as are all the ξ -
parameters when the category did not witness a major new-product introduction.  The new-
product introduction is captured through a step dummy when dealing with stationary series, and 
as a pulse dummy variable in case of unit-root series. 
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where S is volume sales, P is price, ADV denotes advertising expenditures, DIST is distribution 
coverage, FD is feature and display, F is feature activity only, D indicates display activity only, 
and NPI denotes a new-product introduction. Deterministic components include an intercept 
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(c0,.), trend (t) and seasonal dummy variables (SDit), while [ ]tjtjtjtititi PADVSPADVS ,,,,,, µµµµµµ ’ ~ 
N( 0

,Σ).  
From these VARX models, impulse-response functions are derived which trace the over-
time incremental effect of a competitive action (see Bronnenberg et al.  2000 or Dekimpe and 
Hanssens 1999 for a detailed exposition). These impulse-response functions are obtained as the 
difference between two forecasts: (1) an unconditional forecast (i.e., an extrapolation) which 
gives the levels of the performance and marketing variables (in logarithms) that are expected 
based on the available information up to period t-1, and (2) a conditional forecast, obtained after 
a competitive action in period t is taken into account. Competitive actions are defined as 
unexpected one-unit deviations (shocks) in the attacking brand’s advertising and/or price level. 
The successive differences (i.e., at period t, t+1, t+2, …) between both forecasts constitute the 
impulse-response functions (IRFs). Given that we work in log-log space, impulse-response 
estimates have been shown to be elasticities at the unit-shock level, enabling cross-category 
comparisons (Nijs et al. 2001). The IRFs tracing the incremental effect of a competitive action by 
brand i on the sales performance of another brand j (i.e., on Sj) give the cross-sales elasticities 
(ε), while IRFs that track the incremental impact on Pj and ADVj give the corresponding reaction 
elasticities (η). This procedure resulted in 2012 pairwise cross-sales elasticity estimates (and 
corresponding reaction elasticities), from which 158 outlying cases were removed due to extreme 
elasticity values.    
Figure 2 shows some IRFs obtained from the Dutch toilet-tissue market. The different 
panels illustrate the cross-sales impact on (Panel A) and the reactions (Panels B & C) of the 
leading national brand following a price promotion by a challenger, the second-largest national 
brand. Two reaction patterns stand out: a considerable advertising reaction, albeit with a two-
month delay, and accommodating behavior in terms of price (i.e., instead of matching the initial 
price promotion, prices are increased somewhat). The latter reaction is surprising, especially 
when considering the substantial impact of the defender’s price promotions on its own sales 
(Panel E). 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
Impulse-response functions contain many estimates, i.e., one difference or incremental 
impact per future period. To make a comparison across multiple categories more manageable, we 
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follow Nijs et al. (2001) and derive two summary statistics from each impulse-response function: 
(1) the asymptotic value, which measures the persistent or long-run effect, and (2) the net effect 
over the dust-settling period, which is the time needed for the IRF to stabilize, which captures the 
short-run impact. In Figure 2, the long-run impact is zero, i.e., neither sales nor the competitive 
advertising or price levels stabilize at a higher level after the initial price promotion. The relevant 
short-run effects are indicated by the shaded areas in Figure 2.  
In case of very infrequent advertisers (in our case defined as having less than 25 instances 
of advertising), insufficient variability is available in the data to reliably estimate all the φ 
parameters associated with that endogenous variable.  In those instances, advertising for that 
brand is treated as an exogenous variable (unless no advertising at all was used over the 
considered time span, in which case the variable is completely omitted from the model 
specification), whose over-time impact is subsequently derived in IRF format using the procedure 
described in Pesaran and Shin (1998).4 In this way, even if the attacking brand is an infrequent 
advertiser, one can still derive the defending brand’s reaction and cross-sales elasticity to the 
advertising attack. Only when the infrequent advertiser is the defending brand, no reaction 
elasticity is derived.    
 
3.3. Explaining cross-sales and reaction elasticities 
To explain the variability in cross-sales effectiveness and competitive intensity, we stack 
the corresponding elasticities, and link them in a structural model to the covariates of our 
conceptual framework (see Figure 1). Four structural models are estimated, which differ in time 
dimension, short run (SR) versus long run (LR), and in terms of the competitive shock 
instrument considered: price or advertising. Each model consists of three equations, 
corresponding to the following three endogenous variables: (i) a cross-sales elasticity (ε), (ii) a 
reaction elasticity describing the intensity of reaction by means of price promotions (ηP, P for a 
reaction to a competitive price promotion or ηP,ADV for a reaction to a competitive advertising 
shock), and (iii) a reaction elasticity for the intensity of reaction by means of advertising changes 
(ηADV, P or ηADV,ADV). For expository purposes, we consider the model describing the short-run 
reaction to a price promotion. The following structural model is then estimated through weighted 
two-stages least squares, in which advertising and price reaction elasticities are coded in such a 
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way that an increase in their value is associated with a more intense retaliation.  Similarly, 
advertising and promotional cross-sales elasticities are coded so that a more negative number 
corresponds to a larger drop in sales after the attacking brand’s advertising or promotional 
increase.5, 6  
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where BEi (i=A,D) is a given brand’s equity, PLi an indicator variable to denote the private-
label/national-brand nature of brand i, NPp and ASp are used to measure, respectively, the 
neighborhood and asymmetry effect for price, PowerA measures the market power of the 
attacking brand, while PAA-D gives the power asymmetry of the attacker versus the defender, 
Conc is a market-concentration measure  and Growth denotes the average growth rate in the 
category. Details on the specific operationalization of these different constructs are given in 
measurement appendix A.  
Similar structural models are estimated for the short-run effects of an advertising shock, 
and for the long-run impacts of, respectively, price-promotion and advertising shocks. Since we 
do not have access to information on private label advertising, the private label variables are to 
be removed from the structural models where advertising is the initiating instrument. The 
parameters b2,3 and b3,2 are restricted to zero to ensure the model is identified. However, we can 
still infer joint decision making in advertising and promotion reactions from the corresponding 
element of the residual correlation matrix (cf. Powers et al. 1991).  
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Finally, it is worth noting that the effective sample size may vary across different 
moderator equations, and may in some cases be lower than 1854. This is due to the fact that some 
brands advertise regularly, other brands advertise infrequently, while still other brands never 
advertise. We obviously cannot make inferences about the potential effectiveness of non-
advertisers, while, as indicated in the modeling section, we cannot estimate reliably the extent of 
advertising reactivity by infrequent advertisers. We refer to the table below for a detailed 
discussion of the different cases and their implications for sample size. 
 
 Issue Implications for sample size 
Regular advertisers   
Attacker No problem Included in all moderator analyses 
Defender No problem Included in all moderator analyses 
Infrequent advertisers   
Attacker No problem*  
 
Included in all moderator analyses 
Defender Not estimable Excluded from all equations that 
include reactions with advertising 
Zero advertisers   
Attacker Not applicable Excluded from all equations that 
include attacks with advertising 
Defender No problem  
(reaction elasticity = 0) 
Included in all moderator analyses 
* Derived using the Pesaran and Shin (1998) procedure.  
 
 
4. Competitive Reaction and Cross-Sales Effects 
The first-stage empirical results are shown in Table 3 (effects due to price promotion shocks) and 
in Table 4 (effects due to advertising shocks). In each case, we classify various reaction 
behaviors and estimate their effect size. When relevant, we also report separate results for the 
subgroup of frequent (>25 instances) advertisers.  We first derive some generalizations on the 
intensity of reaction, duration of reaction, and choice of marketing instrument, and compare them 
to our hypotheses. We then examine the net cross-sales effects of competitive reactions, in 
magnitude as well as duration. In addition, we report on the effectiveness of the defender’s price 
promotions and advertising on own demand in Table 5. These results provide insight into the 
(likely) effectiveness of reactions by the defender to an attack. 
--- Tables 3 and 4 about here --- 
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4.1. Generalizations on competitive reactions 
Dominant short-run reaction form. Competitive reactions can be retaliatory, accommodating or 
simply absent. Our first result is that, consistent with our hypothesis, the predominant form of 
reaction to advertising and price promotion attacks is no reaction at all. Indeed, 53.7% of price 
promotion attacks receive no short-run promotion reaction, and 85.1% of price promotion attacks 
receive no advertising reaction. By the same token, 82.5% of advertising attacks receive no 
advertising reaction, and 68.3% of advertising attacks receive no promotion reaction. When we 
focus on reactions with the advertising weapon for brands that are “regular” advertisers - defined 
as at least 25 incidences of advertising spending over the four-year period - a passive reaction 
remains the most common one. More specifically, among regular advertisers, price promotion 
(advertising) attacks result in advertising reactions in only 41.4% (46.5%) of the cases. 
 
Simple versus multiple reaction. Simple-reaction patterns tend to be retaliatory in nature, but 
multiple reactions are as often retaliatory as they are accommodating. Significant short-run 
promotion reactions to promotion attacks are nearly twice as likely to be retaliatory than 
accommodating (30.4% vs. 15.9%). Advertising reactions to advertising attacks are four times 
more likely to be retaliatory (37.0% vs. 9.5% for regular advertisers). In contrast, advertising 
reactions to price promotions are about equally often retaliatory as accommodating (7.8% vs. 
7.2% overall, and 21.5% vs. 19.9% for regular advertisers). Similarly, promotion reactions to 
advertising attacks are only slightly more retaliatory (17.3% vs. 14.4% among regular 
advertisers). In conclusion, while managers tend to react in the same direction with the same 
instrument, there is little consensus on how to react with different marketing instruments.  
 
Type of attack. In comparing retaliations to price promotion attacks vs. advertising attacks, the 
former are much stronger, which is consistent with our expectations. The average short-run 
promotion retaliation elasticities are 1.49 for promotion attacks vs. 0.000 for advertising attacks 
by regular advertisers. By the same token, the mean advertising retaliation elasticities are 79.6 for 
promotion attacks vs. 0.59 for advertising shocks by regular advertisers.7  
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Short run versus long run. While long-run reactions are much weaker than their short-run 
counterparts, they follow the same pattern, i.e., if one is higher, so is the other. As a result, the 
average simple short-run promotion reaction elasticity of 0.50 is only 0.01 in the long run. The 
mean simple, short- and long-run advertising reaction elasticities for regular advertisers are 0.28 
and 0.000, respectively. Thus, managers in competitive settings are typically short-run oriented 
and their reactions have little effect on their long-run marketing spending behavior.  
  
4.2. Generalizations on Cross-Sales Effects  
Whether or not competitive reaction is economically beneficial or even necessary depends on the 
effectiveness of both the action and the reaction (Leeflang and Wittink 1996). The VARX 
models described in Section 3 provide short-run and long-run estimates of the total competitive 
effect of the initial attack.That is, after all response and reaction effects have been accounted for, 
how much net benefit or harm occurs to the defending brand? In addition, the VARX models also 
estimate the total own-sales effects of promotion and advertising.   
 
Own effects. We observe (see Table 5), first, that the own-sales effects of promotions are much 
stronger than those of advertising, in the short run and in the long run. This is consistent with our 
hypothesis and helps explain why reactions to price promotions are generally stronger than 
reactions to advertising. The average own-sales promotion elasticities are 3.94 (short run) and 
0.05 (long run). The advertising elasticities for regular advertisers are 0.003 (short run) and 0.000 
(long run).  
--- Table 5 about here --- 
 
Competitive effects. By contrast, the net competitive effect of marketing attacks is predominantly 
sales neutral in the short run. Across all brands studied, 60.4% of promotion attacks have no 
impact on the sales of the defending brand (Table 3). Similarly, for regular advertisers 72.7% of 
the advertising attacks have no significant cross-sales impact (see Table 4). Furthermore, when 
focusing on the remaining cases where significant cross-sales effects were observed, they divide 
out almost evenly between competitive benefit and competitive harm: price promotion attacks 
are beneficial in 20.4% of the cases and harmful in 19.2%. The impacts for advertising attacks 
 - 19 -
are 14.5% and 12.8%. This raises the question to what extent managers’ currently adopted 
reaction rules which are reflected in the net effect one obtains, contribute to the predominant 
pattern (>80%!) of either sales neutrality or competitive benefit, or whether this pattern is mostly 
attributable to the nature of consumer response. In the latter case, neutrality (benefits) would 
result from patterns of consumer response where positive category-demand effects balance 
(outweigh) negative market-share effects. The results of our second-stage analysis, which focus 
on the moderators of competitive reaction behavior, will help us sort out these possibilities. 
In this section, we have examined the cross-sales elasticities and competitive reaction 
elasticities due to a competitive attack using price promotion or advertising. We observe 
considerable variation in the short-run elasticities. In the next section, we will investigate key 
brand and product category sources of this variation. Tables 3 and 4, however, also reveal that 
long-run cross-sales and competitive reaction effects occur only in a minority of cases and the 
average magnitude of the effects is very small. Thus, there is not enough variation to 
meaningfully estimate a structural model of long-term effects moderators. Indeed, no significant 
effects were found in such a model involving long-run elasticities. Nevertheless, from a strategic 
perspective, these exceptional cases are very important, especially those where brands suffer 
long-run damage to their market position. We will therefore conduct in Section 5.3. a set of 
simple statistical comparisons between long-term means in order to provide exploratory insights 
into the determinants of long-term damage. 
  
5.Moderator Effects 
5.1. Moderators of the short-term cross-sales effects of price promotions and advertising 
Table 6 reports the results of the second-stage weighted two-stage least squares analysis for the 
short run cross-sales equations due to a price promotion shock and due to an advertising shock.  
--- Table 6 about here --- 
 
Price promotions. Consistent with expectations, the brand equity of the defender has a positive 
effect on the cross-sales elasticity (b = 0.004, p < 0.05). Further, the higher the brand equity of 
the attacker, the more negative the cross-sales elasticity (b = -0.003, p < 0.10). These results 
indicate that the defender’s sales decline due to a competitive price promotion is larger when the 
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defender is a low-equity brand or the attack is carried out by a high-equity brand. Furthermore, if 
the defender is a private label, the cross-sales elasticity is more negative than when it is a national 
brand (b = -0.253, p < 0.01), which is in line with our predictions.  
Contrary to expectations, when the attacker is a private label, the cross-sales elasticity 
also is more negative (b = -0.241, p < 0.01). One possible explanation for this result might be 
based on Colombo and Morrison (1989). In their work, the market can be divided into two 
groups of consumers, those who tend to be loyal to one brand (“loyals”) and those who are not 
loyal to any brand and are prone to switch between brands (“switchers”). Although it is a 
somewhat simplified view of the market, it has proven remarkably robust and useful in strategic 
marketing analyses. Private labels still tend to be quite often “fighter brands,” i.e., brands that 
command a relatively low degree of brand loyalty, but with a high ability to attract switchers in 
the marketplace (Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997, Wileman and Jary 1997). Consequently, an 
attack by a private label should have significant adverse cross-sales effects (due to the private 
label’s high ability to attract switchers). On the other hand, private labels should be more 
vulnerable to attacks by other brands because of their higher proportion of nonloyals who are 
more inclined to switch to another brand when that offers an attractive deal. 
We find no support for the neighborhood effect or the asymmetry effect.  The intensity of 
competitive retaliation with price promotion has a significant positive effect on the cross-sales 
elasticity of the defender (b = 0.882, p < 0.10). Thus, intense retaliation to a competitive price 
promotion reduces the negative sales effects due to that attack. In contrast, the intensity of 
advertising reaction is not related to the promotion’s cross-sales elasticity.  
Based on the t-ratios, the brand-equity and private-label nature of the attacking and 
defending brands are the two key factors affecting the cross-sales impact of a price promotion. 
The latter result is especially interesting as we control for the asymmetric and neighborhood 
effect of price. This suggests that there is a lot more to private labels than the mere price notion 
typically emphasized in the literature to date.  
 
Advertising. We find support for the neighborhood effect. Consistent with expectations, the 
smaller the difference in advertising effort between attacker and defender, the more negative the 
cross-sales elasticity (b = -0.004, p < 0.10). The asymmetry effect is in the expected direction but 
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is only marginally significant (b = -0.001, p = 0.12). In a price-promotion context, Sethuraman, 
Srinivasan, and Kim (1999) also found in a price promotion context that the asymmetry effect 
was weaker. The intensity of advertising reaction is not related to the advertising cross-sales 
elasticity. However, the intensity of competitive retaliation with price promotion has a significant 
positive effect on the cross-sales elasticity of the defender (b = 1.452, p < 0.10). Thus, intense 
retaliation with price promotion to a competitive advertising attack reduces the negative sales 
effects due to that attack. The effect of the defender’s brand equity is not significant. Finally, the 
attacker’s brand equity has a positive cross-sales effect (b = 0.000, p < 0.01). This finding is 
contrary to our expectation and might be explained by advertising’s primary-demand effect.  
 
5.2. Moderators of the short-term intensity of competitive reaction  
Table 7 reports the results of the moderator analysis on the short-run promotion and advertising 
reaction elasticities in response to both a price-promotion shock and an advertising shock.  
--- Table 7 about here --- 
 
Competitive reaction to price promotions. The moderator effects are summarized in columns 2 
and 4 of  Table 7. While no significant effects are found for advertising reaction, we find a 
number of interesting effects for a price-promotion reaction to an attack with price promotion. 
Consistent with expectations, the more powerful the attacker, the greater is the price 
promotion reaction elasticity (b = 0.175, p < 0.01). This indicates that, relative to a weaker brand, 
a powerful brand initiating a price promotion should count on more aggressive retaliation using 
the same instrument by other brands in the category. However, power asymmetry also matters. 
Controlling for the market power of the attacker, the greater the power disadvantage of the 
defender vis-à-vis the attacker, the less likely that the defender will retaliate (b = -0.087, p < 
0.05). This is consistent with our expectation derived from relative power theory. 
As predicted, a price promotion initiated by a private label evokes less retaliation than a 
promotion attack by a national brand (b = -0.065, p < 0.01). Similarly, a private label reacts less 
aggressively to a price promotion than a national brand does (b = -0.040, p < 0.05). Support is 
also found for our expectation that in concentrated markets, reactions with price promotions are 
less aggressive (b = -0.012, p < 0.01). Furthermore, we find support for the contention that 
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reaction elasticities are higher in growing categories (b = 9.241, p < 0.05). Finally, the larger the 
adverse effect of a competitive price promotion on the sales of the defending brand, the more 
intense it retaliates with price promotion, and vice versa for beneficial effects (b = -0.021, p < 
0.01).  
The residual correlation between the price-promotion reaction elasticity and the advertising 
reaction elasticity is 0.097. This indicates that the intensities of promotion and advertising 
reactions to promotion attacks are, for all practical purposes, independent of each other.  
 
Competitive reaction to advertising. Columns 6 and 8 in Table 7 show the results of the 
moderator analyses of promotion and advertising reactions to advertising attacks. As predicted, 
the more powerful the attacker, the more aggressive the reaction to an advertising shock. We find 
this competitive reaction effect both for price promotion (b = 0.001, p < 0.10) and for advertising 
(b = 0.786, p < .01). Furthermore, the more powerful the attacker vis-à-vis the defender, the less 
aggressive the competitive reaction to an advertising attack with advertising (b = -0.241, p < 
0.10). Similarly, the greater the power asymmetry favoring the attacker, the less aggressive the 
competitive reaction with price promotion, although the effect is only marginally significant (b = 
-0.000, p = 0.11). 
We expected that competitive reactions with price promotion (advertising) are less (more) 
aggressive in more concentrated categories. However, we find that, for reactions with price 
promotions (b = -0.000, p < 0.05) as well as reactions with advertising (b = -0.026, p < 0.01), 
competitive reaction is less aggressive in more concentrated markets.  
In growing categories, we observe less aggressive reactions with advertising in response 
to an advertising attack (b = -43.891, p < 0.01). Furthermore, when sales of the defending brand 
decline due to an advertising shock, there is more aggressive reaction with advertising and vice 
versa (b = -16.868, p < .05). The residual correlation between the price promotion and 
advertising reaction elasticities is 0.116. 
 
5.3. Determinants of long-run cross-sales effects 
Our study has found only a small number of cases were competitive action has a  
permanent impact on the sales of the defending brands.  These exception cases are strategically 
very important, especially those where competitive action ultimately leads to permanent damage 
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to a rival brand’s sales. Table 8 provides a limited statistical profile of these cases relative to all 
others, in the form of a series of comparisons between means.    
For long-run cross-sales effects of price promotions, we find that permanently damaged 
brands are more accommodating with price promotions (p < 0.001) and have lower brand equity 
(p < 0.010). In addition, significant long-run damage occurs more often when the attacker is a 
private label (p<.10). For long-run cross-sales effects of advertising, we again find that 
permanently damaged brands tend to have lower brand equity (p < 0.10). In addition, the brand-
equity of the attacker tends be lower as well (p < 0.05).  
These descriptions of competitive actions with long-run damage are in line with our 
results from the short-run moderator analyses. On the defender’s side, they highlight the 
importance of brand equity to protect its competitive position. On the attacker’s side, they may 
point to the untapped market potential advantage of less established brands, in line with Bolton 
(1989). We therefore offer the tentative generalization that larger brands are better able to defend 
their position, but less established brands are better able to gain permanent ground by aggressive 
marketing. 
--- Table 8 about here --- 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions  
Overall, we have established that the most common form of competitive reaction is passive (i.e., 
no reaction). When reactions do occur, they respond more often to price promotions than to 
advertising. Same-instrument reactions are generally retaliatory, while different-instrument 
reactions can be either retaliatory or accommodating. All forms of competitive reaction are 
largely restricted to short-run movements without long-run consequences.  
While marketing campaigns are often own-sales effective, especially price promotions, 
their influence on competitors’ sales is generally weak, e.g., cross-sales promotion and 
advertising effects are zero in 60% and 73% of the cases, respectively. The moderator analysis 
sheds light on situations when the cross-sales decline is greater. In case of an attack with a price 
promotion, the defending brand is hurt more when the attacker has high brand equity, the 
defender has low brand equity, the attacker is a private label, the defender is a private label, and 
when the defender reacts less aggressively with price promotions. For an attack with advertising, 
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cross-sales decline is greater when the two brands were closer together in advertising expenditure 
and when the attack is carried out by a low equity brand.  
This study also provides insights into another fundamental question in brand competition: 
Why do some actions fail to elicit retaliation from competitors while others provoke an 
aggressive response? We find that, in general, simple reactions with price promotion and/or 
advertising are stronger when the attacker is more powerful, power asymmetry is not (overly) in 
favor of the attacker, the attack is carried out by a national brand, the category is less 
concentrated, and when negative cross-sales effects occur. Interestingly, when negative cross-
sales effects occur, this increases the intensity of simple competitive retaliation, but not multiple 
reactions. Presumably, managers of the affected brand notice the negative cross-sales effect due 
to an attack with a given instrument, conclude that it is an effective weapon (because sales of 
their own brand decline) and therefore choose to respond with this weapon.  These patterns 
suggest that competitive retaliation behavior is “rational” in the sense that it occurs when the 
brand has the motivation and the ability to react. That is, reaction is driven by perceptions that 
the defending brand’s sales need to be and can be protected.  
Notwithstanding this apparent rationality in competitive reaction behavior, we find (based 
on t-value comparisons) that, compared to the other moderating effects, it has only a modest 
impact on the change in net sales of the defending brand. Indeed, the predominant reason for the 
cross-sales neutrality of marketing attacks lies in the nature of consumer response, rather than 
the vigilance of competitors. Specifically, in those  cases where price-promotion shocks had no 
significant cross-effect, more than 55%  were characterized by no reaction with promotion and 
more than 80%  by no reaction with advertising.  Similarly, in those instances where advertising 
attacks were cross-sales neutral, almost 70% had no promotion reactions, while close to 80% had 
no advertising reactions. Hence, the lack of a significant cross-sales effect cannot be attributed to 
successful retaliation. These findings contrast sharply with insights from the management 
literature. For example, in an influential conceptual article, Chen (1996, p. 109) stated that “the 
ultimate effectiveness of an action depends largely on the defenders’ response.” We find no 
support for this claim, at least not at the most basic level of competition, viz., advertising and 
promotion rivalry between company brands. 
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While no reaction is the dominant competitive response mode, the question remains what  
the consequences are when managers do opt to retaliate.  The Table below shows that these 
consequences critically depend on the sign of the cross-sales impact of the attack. Indeed, 
retaliation to harmful attacks rarely has a positive impact on own sales (e.g., a mere 7% of the 
advertising retaliations to a harmful advertising attack is own-sales effective), whereas retaliation 
to a beneficial attack has a positive impact in a majority of cases (e.g., 57% of the advertising 
retaliations to a beneficial advertising attack is own-sales effective).  When averaged across the 
four different retaliation scenarios in the table, only 17%  of retaliations to harmful competitive 
attacks are effective, compared to 64% of retaliations to beneficial competitive attacks. 
Therefore, the major beneficial consequence of retaliation is not the avoidance of negative cross-
effects, but rather the amplification of positive cross-effects. Sales expansive effects of attacks 
make room for sales-effective retaliation, whereas damaging brand-switching effects hamper 
effective retaliation. The implication, subject of course to a brand’s structure of profit margins, is 
an apparent managerial paradox: it is better to react in order to amplify gains than to stem losses.  
       
  Attack causes… 
  Hurt Gain 
Retaliation to price promotion … with price promotion 34% 87% 
 … with advertising 21% 70% 
Retaliation to advertising … with price promotion 11% 43% 
 … with advertising 7% 57% 
Weighted mean  17% 64% 
 
Last, but not least, we comment on the apparent short-run nature of competitive reaction. 
Short-run reaction does not necessarily imply myopic behavior. In the case of advertising, long-
run own-sales effects are virtually non-existent, therefore no long-run competitive reaction is 
needed. In the case of price promotion, the long-run cross-sales effects are also rare, but if they 
do occur, they are often associated with significant short-run effects (the correlation is 0.42). 
Furthermore, when a significant long-run promotion effect occurs, it is almost always preceded 
by a significant short-run effect of the same direction (96% of harmful cases and 84% of 
beneficial cases, with no direction reversals). Even though many of these effects die out, making 
competitive retaliation discretionary from a long-run perspective, managers may still prefer to act 
in a “better safe than sorry” mode and interpret the observed short-term harm as a signal of 
potential long-term threat. This is especially true since the economic consequences of persistent 
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revenue loss are generally larger than those of temporary (or even sustained) excessive promotion 
spending.  
Several areas for future research remain open. First, we now focus on the top three 
brands. A more complete picture on the size and duration of the cross-sales effects, as well as the 
extent of price and advertising reactivity, would be obtained by also considering some of the 
smaller brands. In doing so, we would likely obtain more variability in both the endogenous and 
exogenous variables of the second-stage structural models, which might in turn result in more 
significant effects. Second, several observations in our structural model may violate the 
independence assumption, as most brands appear in multiple observations. For instance, a price 
shock by brand i may have a cross-sales effect on both brand k and brand l in the category, 
causing these observations to be related. Farley and Lehmann (1986) note in this respect that the 
bias due to non-independence may not be serious if the number of correlated observations is 
small relative to the total number of observations. This clearly applies to our study. The number 
of correlated observations was six or less versus a total number of 1814 observations. 
Nevertheless, it would be preferable to account for correlated observations. Sethuraman, 
Srinivasan, and Kim (1999) describe a generalized least-squares procedure to take these 
dependencies into account. We are not aware, however, of extensions of their unweighted single-
equation methodology to our weighted multiple-equation setting.8  
Third, we had no information on private label advertising. Even if these data were 
available, it is not easy to assign advertising effort to the private label in specific categories. As 
the same private label may be much more successful and credible in some categories than in 
others (Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997), it might be that general advertising promoting the private 
label of the retailer is not equally effective in each category. More research is needed to 
investigate the relation between corporate private label advertising and its role in specific 
categories. This issue will become more important in the future as advertising for private labels, 
while still quite rare, is increasing (Zimmerman 1998). Fourth, our data were aggregated along 
multiple dimensions. For instance, all analyses were conducted at the brand rather than the SKU 
level, and involved an aggregation across multiple stores. While Nijs et al. (2001) showed (in the 
context of their primary-demand analyses) that the likely biases from these aggregation 
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operations are small, more research is needed to also establish this in our setting. Finally, more 
work is needed to generalize our findings to other countries. 
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Appendix A – Measurement 
 
Private label vs. national brand. We use a dummy variable to capture the distinction between 
private labels and national brands. This variable takes on a value of 1 if the brand is a private 
label, and 0 if it is a national brand. 
 
Brand equity of the attacker and the defender. Inspired by Yoo, Donthu, and Lee (2000), we 
use the weighted distribution coverage of the brand as a proxy for brand equity. Yoo et al. argued 
that higher distribution intensity implies that consumers need sacrifice less in time and effort to 
acquire the product. They noted that (p. 199) “As distribution intensity increases, therefore, 
consumers have more time and place utility and perceive more value for the product.”  
 
Neighborhood and Asymmetry effect for price promotions. To capture the influence of the 
price promotion neighborhood and asymmetry effects, we use the definition developed in 
Sethuraman, Srinivasan, and Kim (1999). The price distance between two brands is measured by 
( )HL PP−1 , where LP  is the average price of the lower-priced brand and HP  is the average price 
of the higher-priced brand. For interpretational convenience, the sign of the variable is reversed 
such that a positive change in the value of this variable indicates a smaller price distance 
(neighborhood effect).  The asymmetry effect, in turn, is defined as ( ) PHL DUMHLPP ⋅−1 , 
where DUMHLP is equal to 1 when the attacking brand has the highest average price and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Neighborhood and Asymmetry effect for advertising. For advertising we adapt the definition 
used for the neighborhood and asymmetry variables for price promotion described above. For the 
neighborhood effect, we calculate ( )HL AA−1  where LA  denotes the total advertising 
expenditure of the least advertised brand and HA  captures the total advertising expenditures of 
the most advertised brand. For interpretational convenience, the sign of the variable is again 
reversed to obtain the neighborhood effect. In a similar manner, we define the asymmetry effect 
for advertising by ( ) AHL DUMHLAA ⋅−1 , where DUMHLA takes on a value of 1 when the 
 attacker is the most heavily advertised brand, and is equal to 0 in value when the attacking brand 
is less heavily advertised than the defending brand. 
 
Market power attacker. The power of the brand that initiated the marketing attack (either a 
price promotion or an advertising shock) is measured by the brand’s average market share.  
 
Power asymmetry attacker vs. defender. In line with our definition of market power, power 
asymmetry is measured by the difference in market share between the attacker and the defender 
(cf. Molm 1990). 
 
Market concentration. Following Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan (1999), concentration in 
category is captured through a count of the number of brands with a market share exceeding 1%. 
Note that for interpretational convenience, the sign of this variable is reversed such that a 
positive change in the value of this variable is associated with an increase in market 
concentration. 
 
Category growth. The extent of sales growth in a category is measured by the mean of the log 
transformed category sales series in differences. It can easily be shown (see Franses 1998) that 
this metric is approximately equivalent to the growth rate in sales. An advantage of this measure 
is that it can be easily applied to both stationary and evolving series, irrespective of the 
deterministic components contained in the data generating process. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 2A: Impact of a price promotion attack on sales of the defender Figure 2B: Intensity of the defender’s response with advertising 
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 Figure 2C: Intensity of the defender’s response with price promotion  Figure 2D: Effectiveness of the defender’s advertising on demand 
 
Note: dust-settling ends in period 10      Note: dust-settling ends in period 18 
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 Figure 2E: Effectiveness of the defender’s price promotion on demand 
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Table 1A: Expected effect of key determinants of cross-sales effect of defender 
Determinant Expected sign 
  
Brand equity attacker 1)  - 
Brand equity defender 2) + 
Private label attacker + 
Private label defender - 
Neighborhood effect price promotions - 
Asymmetry effect price promotions - 
Neighborhood effect advertising - 
Asymmetry effect advertising - 
Intensity competitive reaction price promotion + 
Intensity competitive reaction advertising + 
 
1) Read as: the higher the brand equity of the attacker, the more negatively (less positively) the sales of the 
defender are affected. 
2) Read as: the higher the brand equity of the defender, the less negatively (more positively) the sales of 
the defender are affected. 
 
 
Table 1B: Expected effect of key determinants of intensity of competitive reaction by defender 
Determinant Expected sign 
  
Market power attacker1) + 
Power asymmetry attacker vs. defender - 
Private label attacker - 
Private label defender - 
Market concentration - (price) / + (adv.) 
Category growth ? 
Cross-sales effect (SR) - 
 
1) Read as: the higher the market power of the attacker the more aggressive (less accommodative) the 
competitive reaction by the defender.  
 
Table 2: Specification of the stage-1 VARX models 
OPTIONS TAKEN 
Regular unit root test ADF; max 8 lags; SBC lag selection criterion; inclusion of deterministic seasonal 
dummies; inclusion of deterministic trend based on Enders (1995) procedure. Unit-root tests 
 
 
Structural-break unit-root test Exogenous break allowed for NPI through the Perron (1989, 1990) test. 
Cointegration tests  
Johansen’s (1988) FIML approach; trend and intercept in cointegrating 
relationship; most significant cointegration vector withheld. 
Endogenous variables Sales, price, and advertising for both the attacking and the defending brand (6).  
In case of infrequent advertisers (< 25 instances), advertising for that brand is 
treated as exogenous. 
Exogenous variables Distribution, feature and display, feature only and display only, for both the 
attacking and defending brand (8). 
Parameterization level Order = 8; autoregressive parameters with |t|<1 restricted to zero; no lagged 
effects for exogenous variables. 
VAR model 
Deterministic components Deterministic seasonal dummies; deterministic trend included based on UR test 
results; step dummy for NPI in I(0) series, pulse dummy for NPI in I(1) series. 
Variable shocked Price & advertising. 
Derivation of shock vector Simultaneous shocking approach described in Dekimpe and Hanssens (1999); 
procedure of Pesaran and Shin (1998) when infrequent advertising spending is 
treated as exogenous variable 
Determination of standard errors 
 
Monte-Carlo simulation, 250 iterations. 
IRF determination 
Derived summary statistics Persistent effect and net effect over the dust-settling period; the dust-settling 
period is defined based on four consecutive IRF estimates that are not 
significantly different from their convergence value. 
 
 
 Table 3: Cross-sales  effects of and reactions to price promotion shocks 
 
Table 3A: Percentage significant short-run estimates following an attack with price promotion 
Short-run cross-sales effect Non-significant Negative cross-sales elasticity Positive cross-sales elasticity 
 60.41% 19.15% 20.44% 
    
 Non-significant Retaliation Accommodation 
Short-run reaction    
… with price promotion 53.73% 30.36% 15.91% 
… with advertising (all)* 85.06% 7.77% 7.17% 
… with advertising (regular advertisers) 58.60% 21.52% 19.88% 
*  Cases with no advertising at all during the sample period and brands with very infrequent advertising (i.e., less than 25 weeks) are counted in the non-significant category. 
 
Table 3B: Estimated short-run elasticities following an attack with price promotion 
Cross-sales effect Mean cross-sales elasticity Mean negative cross-sales elasticity Mean positive cross-sales elasticity 
 0.064 (positive) 3.315 3.286 
    
 Mean reaction elasticity Mean retaliation elasticity Mean accommodation elasticity 
Short-run reaction    
… with price promotion 0.500 (retaliation) 1.490 0.895 
… with advertising (all) 1.376 (accommodation) 79.554 93.118 
… with advertising (regular advertisers) 3.814 (accommodation) 79.554 93.118 
 
Table 3C: Percentage significant long-run estimates following an attack with price promotion 
Cross-sales effect Non-significant Negative cross-sales elasticity Positive cross-sales elasticity 
 97.15% 1.29% 1.56% 
    
 Non-significant Retaliation Accommodation 
Long-run reaction    
… with price promotion 91.42% 5.29% 3.29% 
… with advertising (all)* 99.99% 0.01% 0.00% 
… with advertising (regular advertisers) 99.86% 0.14% 0.00% 
*  Cases with no advertising at all during the sample period and brands with very infrequent advertising (i.e., less than 25 weeks) are counted in the non-significant category. 
 
 Table 3D: Estimated long-run elasticities following an attack with price promotion 
Cross-sales effect Mean cross-sales elasticity Mean negative cross-sales elasticity Mean positive cross-sales elasticity 
… in the long run 0.004 (positive) 0.452 0.570 
    
 Mean reaction elasticity Mean retaliation elasticity Mean accommodation elasticity 
Long-run reaction    
… with price promotion 0.010 (retaliation) 0.160 0.096 
… with advertising (all) 0.008 (retaliation) 13.313 4.05 
… with advertising (regular advertisers) 0.022 (retaliation) 13.313 4.05 
 
 Table 4: Cross-sales  effects of and reactions to advertising shocks 
 
Table 4A: Percentage significant short-run estimates following an attack with advertising 
Cross-sales effect Non-significant Negative cross-sales elasticity Positive cross-sales elasticity 
 72.71% 12.83% 14.46% 
    
 Non-significant Retaliation Accommodation 
Short-run reaction    
… with price promotion 68.33% 17.31% 14.36% 
… with advertising (all)* 82.49% 13.95% 3.56% 
… with advertising (regular advertisers) 53.51% 37.03% 9.46% 
*  Cases with no advertising during the sample period and brands with very infrequent advertising (i.e., less than 25 weeks) are counted in the non-significant category. 
 
Table 4B: Estimated short-run elasticities following an attack with advertising 
Cross-sales effect Mean cross-sales elasticity Mean negative cross-sales elasticity Mean positive cross-sales elasticity 
 0.001 (positive) 0.013 0.013 
    
 Mean reaction elasticity Mean retaliation elasticity Mean accommodation elasticity 
Short-run reaction    
… with price promotion 0.000 (accommodation) 0.000 0.000 
… with advertising (all) 0.105 (retaliation) 0.592 0.254 
… with advertising (regular advertisers) 0.279 (retaliation) 0.592 0.254 
 
Table 4C: Percentage significant long-run estimates following an attack with advertising 
Cross-sales effect Non-significant Negative cross-sales elasticity Positive cross-sales elasticity 
 98.67% 0.92% 0.41% 
    
 Non-significant Retaliation Accommodation 
Long-run reaction    
… with price promotion 96.03% 1.83% 2.14% 
… with advertising (all)* 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
… with advertising (regular advertisers) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
*  Cases with no advertising during the sample period and brands with very infrequent advertising (i.e., less than 25 weeks) are counted in the non-significant category. 
 Table 4D: Estimated long-run elasticities following an attack with advertising 
Cross-sales effect Mean cross-sales elasticity Mean negative cross-sales elasticity Mean positive cross-sales elasticity 
… in the long run 0.001 (negative) 0.013 0.013 
    
 Mean reaction elasticity Mean retaliation elasticity Mean accommodation elasticity 
Long-run reaction    
… with price promotion 0.000 (accommodation) 0.000 0.000 
… with advertising (all) 0.000 (non-response) 0.000 0.000 
… with advertising (regular advertisers) 0.000 (non-response) 0.000 0.000 
 
 Table 5: Own-sales  effects of price promotion and advertising shocks 
 
Table 5A: Percentage significant short-run estimates of advertising and price promotion on own-sales 
 Non-significant Positive own-sales elasticity Negative own-sales elasticity 
… of price promotions 30.96% 63.54% 5.50% 
… of advertising 67.00% 20.45% 12.55% 
 
 
Table 5B: Elasticity estimates of short-run advertising and price promotion on own-sales 
 Mean own-sales elasticity Mean positive own-sales elasticity Mean negative own-sales elasticity 
… of price promotions 3.944 (positive) 5.752 3.989 
… of advertising 0.003 (positive) 0.017 0.014 
 
Table 5C: Percentage significant long-run estimates of advertising and price promotion on own-sales 
 Non-significant Positive own-sales elasticity Negative own-sales elasticity 
… of price promotions 94.99% 4.15% 0.86% 
… of advertising 98.23% 1.28% 0.49% 
 
 
Table 5D: Elasticity estimates of long-run advertising and price promotion on own-sales 
 Mean own-sales elasticity Mean positive own-sales elasticity Mean negative own-sales elasticity 
… of price promotions 0.046 (positive) 0.876 0.604 
… of advertising 0.000 (positive) 0.002 0.002 
 Table 6: Effects of key determinants of cross-sales effects 
Determinant Cross-sales elasticity of price promotion (N=1506) 
Cross-sales elasticity of  
Advertising (N=816) 
 Parameter t-value parameter t-value 
Brand equity attacker -0.003c -1.378 0.000a 2.882 
Brand equity defender 0.004b 2.325 -0.000 -0.437 
Private label attacker -0.241a -2.343   
Private label defender -0.253a -2.884   
Neighborhood effect price promotions -0.127 -0.620   
Asymmetry effect price promotions 0.146 0.622   
Neighborhood effect advertising   -0.004b -2.148 
Asymmetry effect advertising   -0.001 -1.181 
Intensity competitive reaction with price promotion 0.882c 1.568 1.452c 1.287 
Intensity competitive reaction with advertising -0.003 -0.193 0.002 0.687 
a = p < .01 
b = p < .05 
c = p < .10 
* All tests are one-sided 
 
 
 
 Table 7: Effects of key determinants of intensity of competitive reaction  
Determinant Reaction to price promotion Reaction to advertising 
 … with price promotion (N=1854) 
… with advertising 
(N=1506) 
… with price promotion 
(N=982) 
… with advertising 
(N=816) 
 parameter t-value Parameter t-value parameter t-value parameter t-value 
Market power attacker 0.175a 2.438 -80.562 -1.213 0.001c 1.423 0.786a 2.797 
Power asymmetry attacker vs. defender -0.087b -1.844 24.516 0.736 -0.000 -1.232 -0.241c -1.536 
Private label attacker -0.065a -2.554 10.532 1.065     
Private label defender -0.040b -1.833 6.527 0.512     
Market concentration -0.012a -6.723 1.488 0.850 -0.000b -2.089 -0.026a -4.686 
Category growth 9.241b 2.230 -499.519 -0.191 0.019 0.916 -43.891a -3.691 
Cross-sales effect -0.021a -2.464 -1.272 -0.082 0.012 0.875 -16.868b -2.216 
a = p < .01 
b = p < .05 
c = p < .10 
* All tests are one-sided, except for category growth 
 
 
  
 
 Table 8: Mean deviations as key determinants of long-run cross-sales effects 
Determinant Cross-sales elasticity of price promotion 
Cross-sales elasticity of  
advertising 
 mean 1 mean 2 p-value mean 1 mean 2 p-value 
Brand equity attacker 63.616 66.003 0.571 62.153 76.527 0.026 
Brand equity defender 59.346 66.963 0.067 59.642 71.361 0.077 
Private label attacker** 0.340 0.224 0.053    
Private label defender** 0.180 0.222 0.477    
Neighborhood effect price promotions 0.251 0.259 0.750    
Asymmetry effect price promotions 0.126 0.127 0.984    
Neighborhood effect advertising    0.919 0.828 0.164 
Asymmetry effect advertising    0.968 0.914 0.280 
Intensity of long-run competitive reaction with price promotion 0.064 -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.878 
Intensity of long-run competitive reaction with advertising -0.102 0.020 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.393 
*  p-values are 2-sided 
**  Test for equality of proportions used. 
note: mean 1 is the mean value of the moderator variables for those cases where sales of a competitor were significantly hurt in the long run.  mean 2 is the mean value of the 
moderator variables for all other cases. 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
1 There is similarity between the asymmetric effect and the private label vs. national brand effect, as private labels 
are often – but certainly not always– lower in price than national brands (Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997). Indeed, 
some authors have largely equated the two effects by operationalizing the asymmetric effect in a national brands 
versus private labels context (Allenby and Rossi 1991, Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989). However, although 
related, the two phenomena are certainly not identical. As noted above, the quality of private labels is often close 
to the quality of national brands, and the price gap is sometimes very small (Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997, 
Zimmerman 1998). Further, some people have a preference for private labels because it facilitates decision 
making, they purchase the private label as a choice heuristic (Ailawadi, Neslin, and Gedenk 2001). 
 
2   These 442 categories are selected from a broader database of 560 categories, using the following criteria: the top 
three brands have a combined market share in excess of 15 percent and each brand has nonzero weekly sales 
throughout the period.  
 
3  To avoid over-parameterization, we do not estimate a nine-equation model with the sales, advertising and price 
series of the top three brands as endogenous variables. In that case, every additional autoregressive lag would 
result in the estimation of 81 additional parameters. Instead, we estimate 3 six-equation models, covering, 
respectively, brands (1,2), (1,3) and (2,3). 
4  Hence, depending on whether or not the attacking and defending brand are infrequent advertisers, a six, five or 
four-equation model is estimated. 
5  A weighted estimation procedure is used to account for the fact that the endogenous variables are estimated 
quantities. Weights are the inverse of the standard error of an equation’s dependent variable.  In one instance 
(advertising response to a price promotion attack), White’s test showed no evidence of heteroskedasticity, in 
which case the observations were not weighted (see Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen 1996 or Nijs et al. 2001 for a 
similar procedure). 
6  The following subscripts are used for the exogenous variables: A for Attacking brand and D for Defending brand.  
7  The unusually high advertising reaction elasticity in response to price shocks come from the possibility of high 
spending jumps or cuts, for example from 50 GRPs to 300 GRPs.   
8  Sethuraman et al. (1999) apply either a weighted least squares procedure to account for the fact that their 
dependent variables are estimated quantities, or the generalized least squares procedure on unweighted data to 
correct for dependencies among the observations. Their results were found to be robust across both procedures. 
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